The
history of the United States’ involvement in the political affairs of foreign
nations is not an exceptionally long one.
For the first one hundred thirty years of American history, the nation
largely kept to itself on the international stage; a policy known as
isolationism. The reasons for this
self-induced isolation are multiple. On
one hand, the nation followed George Washington’s advice to avoid foreign
entanglements, while on another the country had a literal ocean between it and
the hotbed of political activity at the time—Europe. Once the United States truly stepped onto the
global stage in the aftermath of World War One, the nation’s outlook on foreign
involvement began to evolve, culminating in the present-day struggle between national
interest and self-determination.
In the peace negotiations following
World War One, a domestic debate within the United States was how big of a role
the nation should play in international affairs. While by 1917 most of the country, and over
ninety-percent of Congress, supported going to war, the old isolationist
feelings returned shortly after the armistice.
Republicans in particular led the charge for a return to isolation,
seeing no advantages in associating the nation with Europe. They were opposed primarily by President
Woodrow Wilson who was the main architect of the Paris Peace Conference.
Even before the formal end of the war, Wilson
gave a speech to a joint session of Congress which has become known to history
as the “Fourteen Points.” The fourteen ideas
set forth by Wilson were an attempt to formalize the post-war aims of the
United States, propositions which American foreign policy has largely ignored
since their proposal. The points can be
summarized as transparency, liberalization of trade, demilitarization, and
self-determination. The fourteenth point
introduced the concept of the League of Nations, an international organization
through which nations could settle differences diplomatically as opposed to
forcibly. America, still dominated by
isolationism, was not yet ready to involve themselves so intimately with the
rest of the international community, and thus did not go along with Wilson’s
plans.
The primary debate in the aftermath
of World War Two, when the United States firmly accepted its place as the
dominant nation in the world, became whether to support self-determination
abroad or to protect national interests.
It was in this regard that President Obama was harshly criticized by
conservative pundits during his first-term for the supposed “Apology Tour” when
he acknowledged the America has made mistakes in its foreign policy in the
past. While it appears that the United
States may be leaning towards a more self-determinationistic approach, the last
seventy years have been dominated by protection of national interests; this in
despite of America’s dedication to freedom.
An early example which has continued
to leave repercussions into today is Iran.
President Eisenhower, in an attempt to stabilize oil supplies for the
United States, organized a coup to install Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi as the
leader of the nation. Pahlavi was never
exactly a humanitarian, often drawing criticism from the international
community, but the support of the United States prevented any meaningful
international action against his government.
In 1979, however, a popular revolt led by angry students ousted Pahlavi
and installed an Islamic government which naturally fostered an unfavorable
opinion of America. This has resulted in
a government of Iran which has been antagonistic towards the United States for
the past four decades; one which is on the verge of obtaining nuclear
weapons. If the American government
would have taken a more self- determinationistic approach—one which would have
supported democracy in Iran, even if it initially resulted in an anti-American
government. This support for democracy
would have given the general population reason to like America and Americans,
thus likely leading to more favorable relations in the future (the current
present).
The position of the United States
with relation to other oil-producing nations in the Middle East, even up to
today, follows a similar model as Iran.
Notable are Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, where the United States supports
oppressive monarchies, often providing them with the arms they use to suppress
insurrection. America typically does
this in exchange for favorable oil rights, but in the case of Bahrain, the
United States has interest in maintaining a vital naval base from which the
U.S. Navy can launch missions in the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Horn of Africa,
and the Indian Ocean. While these may
seem like favorable situations in terms of American benefits, they are likely
to blow-up in the American government’s face in the future, just as Iran
did.
The history of America’s involvement
with a brutal regime in South Vietnam is rather well-known as well. Desperate to prevent South Vietnam from
falling into communist hands, the American government under Eisenhower supported
the government of Ngo Dinh Diem, a horrific leader who brutalized his own
people in order to ensure he maintained power.
The United States largely ignored these humanitarian atrocities as long
as Diem remained anti-communist, until eventually the C.I.A. supported the
South Vietnamese military in assassinating Diem. By that time, however, the damage was already
done to the image of the United States, fueling the Vietcong and North
Vietnamese forces. American assistance
to self-determination in South Vietnam likely would have faced more opposition
domestically than in Iran, due to the Cold War rhetoric. Iran was not under heavy threat of communism,
at least not to the degree that South Vietnam was; the likelihood that the
people would have chosen to unite with North Vietnam—probably under a communist
government—virtually ensured that the United States would not allow
self-determination. The consequences of
the United States favoring its own interests as opposed to self-determination
in Vietnam also differ from the historical example of Iran. While the nation fought a war with South
Vietnamese rebels—the Vietcong—and the communist North Vietnam, relations
between the unified Vietnam and the United States have generally been favorable
for the past decade; this in stark contrast to Iranian-American relations.
A more contemporary example of this
difficult foreign policy decision lays in the nation of Egypt, particularly in
the aftermath of its Arab Spring revolt against Hosni Mubarak, the “president”
of Egypt for thirty years. Mubarak was
often supported by the United States, both through foreign aid dollars and arms
deals, due to his secular government and the peace he maintained between Egypt
and Israel. As usual, Mubarak also
frequently showed a distain for human rights by suppressing opposition parties,
rigging elections in favor of his party, jailing political dissidents
indefinitely, and limiting criticism of his ruling party. When the population rose against him in early
2011, President Obama’s administration was careful to not take a side too
clearly, stating that the people must be heard but discouraging violence from
either side.
The
key issue involving Egypt, however, came not from the executive branch as much
as the legislative branch and the media.
When it became common knowledge that the Muslim Brotherhood, a large
Islamic political organization, was playing a prominent role in the popular
rebellion, conservative Congress members and media members from both sides of
the political spectrum began to worry about Egypt becoming an Islamic state;
this despite the Brotherhood’s assertions that it was dedicated to a democratic
Egypt. This apprehension only increased
in the wake of Egypt’s first successful election, which saw the Brotherhood win
control of the Egyptian presidency. Even
as Egyptians were celebrating their new political freedoms, some Americans
began worrying that they were using these freedoms wrong by electing
politicians who did not universally agree with American policies.
Another
contemporary issue is the ongoing crisis in Syria and America’s lack of a
clear-cut position on the civil war.
While in this case the United States did not play a part in supporting Bashar
al-Assad—a role instead played by Iran—America has nonetheless descended into
self-determination or national interest internal debate. The United States has been hesitant to
involve itself too much in the conflict due to the risk of incurring retaliatory
strikes from Iran, destabilizing the Middle East, providing more recruitment
material for extremist groups, and the fear that fundamentalist Islamic groups
could replace al-Assad’s government.
While these are legitimate concerns, if the United States was dedicated
to self-determination the conflict would have been resolved thousands of lives
ago. The American interest in resolving the
conflict should be apparent; assisting Syrians in their pursuit of a true
representative government would likely foster pro-American feelings in one of
the most important regions in the world.
By no means is this a comprehensive
list of all the instances of this trend in the previous seven decades of American
history, nor is it an implicit assertion that self-determination is always the
correct choice. While self-determination
is often a desirable outcome, if it always came into fruition there would be
hundreds of additional nations, even further complicating the international
process. The United States has a
checkered past in this area and while it seems to potentially be shifting from
a foreign policy guided by national interests towards one more internationally
oriented, it is unlikely that America will become a great liberator of
oppressed people any time soon.
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